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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Chantel Tucker appeals, contending that the district court abused its discretion
when it relinquished jurisdiction over her following a period of retained jurisdiction, or
alternatively, by not reducing her sentences when it did so.

She also contends that the

grounds of appeal make out a colorable need for the inclusion of the transcript of the
August 12, 2010, sentencing hearing and the July 25, 2013, objection to the record
hearing in the appellate record.

Specifically, the sentencing transcript impacts the

decision to relinquish jurisdiction and was part of the record available to the district court
at that time.

The objection to the record transcript is necessary because it

demonstrates the district court's error in denying Ms. Tucker's request for the
sentencing transcript. Therefore, even under the Idaho Supreme Court's recent opinion
in State v. Brunet, 155 Idaho 724 (2013), reh'g denied, the Idaho Supreme Court's
decision to deny her motion to augment the record with those transcripts violated her
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. As a result, this Court should
grant Ms. Tucker access to the requested transcripts and allow her the opportunity to
file supplemental briefing raising any issues arising from review of those transcripts.
In the event that request is denied, this Court should still vacate the district
court's order relinquishing jurisdiction over Ms. Tucker and remand this case for an
order placing her on probation.

Alternatively, this Court should either reduce her

sentence as it sees fit or remand the case so the district court can reduce her sentence.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In April 2009, the State charged Ms. Tucker with possession of a controlled
substance, methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia (hereinafter, the
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Cassia County case). (R., Vol.1, pp.19-20)1 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Ms. Tucker
entered a plea of guilty to the possession of methamphetamine charge, and in
exchange, the State dismissed the possession of drug paraphernalia charge and
recommended Ms. Tucker's participation in drug court. (R., Vol.1, pp.67-68.) There
was no agreement as to recommendations on the underlying sentence. (See generally
R., Vol.1, pp.67-69.)

In fact, no sentence was imposed, as Ms. Tucker was

subsequently accepted into drug court. (See R., Vol.1, pp.13-16 (register of actions for
the relevant time period); see generally R., Vol.1, pp.57-174.)
Ms. Tucker was ultimately terminated from drug court in May 2010. (R., Vol.1,
p.123.) While Ms. Tucker did not agree with the allegations underlying that order, she
decided to not contest the order and proceed to sentencing. (R., p.162.) As such, the
district court ordered preparation of a presentence report (hereinafter, PSI). The GAIN-I
Recommendation and Referral Summary (hereinafter, GRRS) attached to that report
indicated that Ms. Tucker had been diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder. (GRRS
attached to PSI, p.2.) Nevertheless, a letter from the Idaho Department of Health and
Welfare (hereinafter, IDHW) verified that Ms. Tucker had been maintaining two jobs,
had a strong support network centered around her children's paternal grandparents,
and had been consistently performing drug tests with negative results.
Beth Bristol attached to PSI, dated July 17, 2010.)

(Letter from

As a result, IDHW intended to

continue the reunification process with Ms. Tucker and her children, but were waiting on
the sentencing decision to do so.

(Letter from Beth Bristol attached to PSI.)

The

The records on appeal for these two cases were prepared in separately bound and
paginated volumes. To avoid confusion, the volume prepared for the Cassia County
case (docket number 40981) will be referred to as "Vol.1." The record prepared for the
Minidoka County case (docket number 40923) will be referred to as "Vol.2.
1
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presentence investigator recommended that Ms. Tucker be placed on probation
because she had continued to participate in treatment programs even after being
removed from the drug court program, had employment arranged, and had enrolled in
collegiate classes. (PSI, p.10.) Ultimately, the district court imposed a unified sentence
of seven years, with two years fixed, which it suspended for a five-year period of
probation. (R., Vol.1, pp.165, 171-72.)
Nearly two years later, when Ms. Tucker's mother passed away, she relapsed.
(Tr., p.23, Ls.22-25.)

As a result, the State filed a motion for probation violation

based on the fact that new charges for possession of a controlled substance,
methamphetamine, and possession of drug paraphernalia had been filed in Minidoka
County

(hereinafter, the Minidoka County case).

(R., Vol.1, pp.188-89; R., Vol.2,

pp.10-11.)
Ms. Tucker ultimately entered into a global plea agreement, by which she would
plead guilty to possession of methamphetamine in the Minidoka County case, and
thereby admit the violation of her probation in the Cassia County case.

(R., Vol.2,

pp.34-36.) In exchange, the State would dismiss all remaining charges, recommend a
unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, in the Minidoka County case to be
served concurrently with the sentence in the Cassia County case, and would
recommend that the district court retain jurisdiction in both cases so Ms. Tucker could
participate in the CAPP rider program. (Tr., p.5, L.18 - p.6, L.17; R., Vol.2, pp.34-36.)
Defense counsel recommended the same underlying sentence, but requested the
district court suspend the sentences for a period of probation instead. (Tr., p.22, Ls.1419.)

Ms. Tucker informed the district court that she would lose custody over her

children if she was sent to the CAPP program. (Tr., p.25, Ls.3-6.) The district court
3

recognized several of these issues, but determined that the CAPP rider program would
provide Ms. Tucker the opportunity to get in better control of her addiction. (Tr., p.25,
L.20 - p.26, L.13.) Therefore, it revoked Ms. Tucker's probation in the Cassia County
case and executed the underlying sentence and imposed a consecutive unified
sentence of five years, with two years fixed, in the Minidoka County case, and retained
jurisdiction in both cases. (R., Vol.1, pp.222-26; R., Vol.2, pp.44-49.)
The rider staff ultimately recommended that the district court relinquish
jurisdiction over Ms. Tucker because of her unwillingness to participate in the rider
program. (Addendum to PSI (hereinafter, APSI), cover letter.) The staff reported that
Ms. Tucker had completed most of her assigned programs, but had failed the Moral
Recanation Therapy (hereinafter, MRT) program and was removed from her Computer
Literacy program. (APSI, p.2.) The rider staff also reported that Ms. Tucker was not
honest with them during the MRT program. (APSI, p.6.) They also noted that, while
Ms. Tucker had not received any formal disciplinary reports, there were several informal
sanctions imposed against her.

(APSI, pp.4-5.)

The district court ultimately

relinquished jurisdiction over Ms. Tucker without a hearing.

(R., Vol.1, pp.229-32;

R., Vol.2, pp.57-60.) She also filed a motion pursuant to I.C.R. 35 in the Minidoka case
requesting that the district court reconsider the sentence. (R., Vol.2, p.62.) The district
court granted that motion, ordering the two sentences to be served concurrently
because it felt that Ms. Tucker needed access to the prison's therapeutic community
program and the sentences as originally structured would unacceptably delay her
participation in that program. (R., Vol.2, p.62.)
Ms. Tucker ultimately filed timely notices of appeal from the orders relinquishing
jurisdiction.

(R., Vol.1, pp.239-40; R., Vol.2, pp.79-80.)
4

She subsequently filed

amended notices of appeal. (R., Vol.1, pp.248-51; R., Vol.2, pp.88-91.) In the Cassia
County case, the amended notice of appeal included requests for preparation of the
transcripts of several hearings:

the August 27, 2009, change of plea hearing, the

January 8, 2010, evidentiary hearing, the August 12, 2010 sentencing hearing, and the
August 9, 2012, disposition hearing.2 (R., Vol.1, pp.248-51.) The State objected to that
amended notice of appeal. (R., Vol.1, pp.253-57.) The district court held a hearing to
address that issue on July 25, 2013. At that hearing, defense counsel "argue[d] his
motion re: request to amend the Motion and need for transcripts at the county's
expense; cite[d] considerations." (Augmentation - Minutes.)3 Counsel for the State
"argue(d] against the motion for transcripts paid by the county; cite[d] considerations."
(Augmentation -

Minutes.)

The district court denied that motion and "cite[d]

considerations" for doing so. (Augmentation - Minutes.) The district court subsequently
prepared an order to that effect: "for the reasons stated in open court at the hearing
(the court] does hereby sustain the objection as to the transcript Sentencing hearing
held on August 12, 2010 .... " (Augmentation - Order.)
As a result, once the record was settled, Ms. Tucker filed a motion to augment
the record with the transcripts from the August 12, 2010, sentencing hearing and the
transcript of the July 25, 2013, telephonic hearing on the objection to the record.
(Motion to Augment and To Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support
Thereof, filed October 18, 2013.) The Idaho Supreme Court denied that motion without

Ms. Tucker is not pursuing her requests for the transcripts of the August 27, 2009,
change of plea hearing or the January 8, 2010, evidentiary hearing in this appeal.
3 A motion to augment the record with the minutes of the July 25, 2013, hearing, as well
as the subsequent order has been filed contemporaneously with this brief.

2

5

explanation. (Order Denying Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule,
dated November 22, 2013.)

6

ISSUES
1.

Whether the district court denied Ms. Tucker due process and equal protection
when it denied her request in the Amended Notice of Appeal to include
transcripts necessary for review of the issues on appeal.

2.

Whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied Ms. Tucker due process and equal
protection when it denied her motion to augment the record with transcripts
necessary for review of the issues on appeal.

3.

Whether the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction
over Ms. Tucker, or, alternatively, by not reducing her sentences when it did so.

7

ARGUMENT

I.
The District Court Denied Ms. Tucker Due Process And Equal Protection When It
Denied Her Request In The Amended Notice Of Appeal To Include Transcripts
Necessary For Review Of The Issues On Appeal
The Idaho Supreme Court recently considered when indigent defendants are
entitled to transcripts prepared at state expense on appeal. Brunet, 155 Idaho 724. Its
opinion reaffirmed the existing standard of review, which is that, when reviewing
decisions such as the decision to relinquish jurisdiction, "this Court conducts an
independent review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing,
focusing on the objectives of criminal punishment." Id. at 728 (emphasis added) (citing

State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010)). The Idaho Supreme Court also recognized that
there is a federal and state constitutional requirement for the State to provide transcripts
sufficient for an adequate appellate review. See id. at 727-28 (citing Mayer v. City of

Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 195 (1971); State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457,462 (2002)).
That requirement is part of the guarantees in the United States Constitution and
the Constitution of the State of Idaho that criminal defendants shall have due process
and equal protection under the law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Idaho Const. art. I,§ 13.
Essentially, due process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair."

Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Serv. of Durham City, 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981); State v. Card,
121 Idaho 425, 445 (1991 ).

Those same standards have been applied to article I,

section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. Maresh v. State, Dep't of Health & Welfare ex rel.

Caballero, 132 Idaho 221,227 (1998).
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the question of whether
transcripts must be provided to indigent defendants when such a right is established.

8

See, e.g., Griffin v. fllinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)4; Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959);
Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 494-95 (1963); Mayer, 404 U.S. 189. Its decisions

have established two fundamental themes.

First, the scope of the due process and

equal protection clauses is broad. Second, disparate treatment of indigent defendants
is not tolerable. As a result, the State must provide an adequate record for appellate
review, but that record need not include frivolous or unnecessary materials. See, e.g.,
Mayer, 404 U.S. at 195.

As a result, the Idaho Supreme Court held that, in order to show that the
transcript requested is necessary for an adequate appellate review, the party moving for
its inclusion in the record "must make out a colorable need for the additional
transcripts."5 Brunet , 155 Idaho at 727; but see Mayer, 404 U.S. at 195 ("where the

4

In Griffin, the United States Supreme Court held:
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitions from invidious
discriminations.

Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted).
"It is well established that an appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate
record upon which the appellate court can review the merits of the claims of error, ...
and where pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to
support the actions of the trial court." State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999);
see also State v. Mowrey, 128 Idaho 804, 805 (1996) (applying this presumption in
absence of a complete record). Therefore, if Ms. Tucker fails to provide the appellate
court with the transcripts necessary for review of her claims, this legal presumption will
apply and Ms. Tucker's claims regarding the erroneous relinquishment of jurisdiction
9

5

grounds of appeal, as in this case, make out a colorable need for a complete transcript,
the burden is on the State to show that only a portion of the transcript or an 'alternative'
will suffice for an effective appeal on those grounds").
In this case, the grounds of appeal make out a colorable need for the inclusion of
the transcript of the sentencing hearing in the appellate record.

The minutes of

sentencing hearing held on August 12, 2010, indicate that "Ms. Tucker addresses the
Court." (R., Vol.1, pp.164-65.) When a defendant makes a statement of allocution at a
sentencing hearing, those comments are relevant to the sentencing determination.
See, e.g., State v. Gervasi, 138 Idaho 813, 816 (Ct. App. 2003), abrogated on other

grounds by State v. Hansen, 154 Idaho 882, 887-88 (Ct. App. 2013), rev. denied,
(finding that, while allocution is important, it does not rise to the level of a constitutionally
protected right, as the opinions in Gervasi and other cases had suggested). Therefore,
those statements are relevant to the subsequent question of whether to reduce the
sentence pursuant to Rule 35. See Merwin, 131 Idaho at 648; State v. Lee, 117 Idaho
203, 205 (Ct. App. 1990).

However, the minutes do not reveal the contents of

and the violation of her due process rights by the district court will not be addressed on
their merits. In effect, that presumption (a result of the Idaho Supreme Court and the
district court not affording her access to relevant transcripts) would deprive her of an
effective appeal, making the appeal constitutionally invalid on due process and equal
protection grounds. See Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 480-85 (1963) (holding that it is
"constitutionally invalid . . . to prevent an indigent from taking an effective appeal")
(emphasis added).
Alternatively, if it is state action alone which prevents the defendant from having
access to the necessary items, because such action is a violation of equal protection
and due process, any such presumption should no longer apply. See, e.g., id. at 485.
In this situation, the foregoing presumption should be reversed, and what occurred at
those hearings should be presumed to discredit the district court's decisions. For
example, the transcript from the sentencing hearing should be not be presumed to
support the decision to relinquish jurisdiction because the district court obviously
concluded at the sentencing hearing that the aggravating information was insufficient to
justify incarcerating Ms. Tucker at that time, given the objectives of sentencing. See
I.C. § 19-2521; State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648 (1998).
10

Ms. Tucker's statements to the district court.

(See generally R., Vol.1, pp.164-65.)

Therefore, the minutes of these hearings do not provide an adequate alternative to the
verbatim transcript. Thus, the grounds of appeal make out a colorable need for the
transcript of the August 12, 2010, sentencing hearing in this case.
The only other question, then, is whether those statements were part of the entire
record available to the district court when it subsequently revoked Ms. Tucker's
probation. See Brunet, 155 Idaho at 728; Pierce, 150 Idaho at 5. The district court is
entitled to rely on the knowledge gained from its own official position and observations,
and thus, it is actually expected to rely on its memory of prior proceedings in a case.
See Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 2001); see also State v. Sivak,
105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983) (recognizing that the findings of the trial judge in sentencing
are based, in part, upon what the district court heard during trial); State v. Wallace, 98
Idaho 318, 321 (1977) (recognizing that the district court could rely upon "the number of
certain types of criminal transactions that [the judge] has observed in the courts within
his judicial district and the quantity of drugs therein involved"); State v. Adams, 115
Idaho 1053, 1055-56 (Ct. App. 1989) (recognizing that the district court "naturally and
quite properly remembers the entire course of events and considers all relevant facts in
reaching a decision"); State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491, 495 (Ct. App. 1984) (noting that
"the judge hardly could be expected to disregard what he already knew about (the
defendant] from the other case").

Since the same district court judge who relinquished

jurisdiction over Ms. Tucker also presided over the sentencing hearing (compare

R., Vol.1, pp.164, 229-32), the comments made by Ms. Tucker at that hearing are part
of the record that was available to the district court when it relinquished jurisdiction over
her.
11

Therefore, because the grounds of appeal make out a colorable need for that
transcript and it was part of the record before the district court when it relinquished
jurisdiction, due process and equal protection require that they be augmented to the
appellate record. Mayer, 404 U.S. at 195; Brunet, 155 Idaho at 727. As such, the
district court's decision to deny Ms. Tucker's request to augment the record with that
transcript each violate her constitutional rights to due process and equal protection.
In that same vein, an adequate appellate record is necessary to vindicate
Ms. Tucker's constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.

See, e.g.,

Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 397 (1985) (relying on Douglas v. California, 372

U.S. 353, 355-56 (1963), and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-45 (1963)).
Appellate counsel is required to make a conscientious examination of the case and file
a brief in support of the best arguments to be made. See, e.g., Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). The standards for effective appellate representation are set
forth in the American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal Justice, The Defense
Function. State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989), overruled on other grounds
by Card, 121 Idaho at 432. Specifically, Standard 4-8.3(b) provides:

Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel,
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . . . Counsel
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance.
In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate counsel can
neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be presented on
appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's decision to
12

revoke probation, which is now at issue.

Further, counsel is unable to advise

Ms. Tucker on the probable role the transcripts may play in her appeal. Therefore,
Ms. Tucker has not obtained appellate review of the court proceedings based on the
merits of her claims and likely was not provided with effective assistance of counsel in
that endeavor.
11.
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Ms. Tucker Due Process And Equal Protection When
It Denied Her Motion To Augment The Record With Transcripts Necessary For Review
Of The Issues On Appeal
As discussed in Section I, supra, the grounds for appeal make out a colorable
need for the inclusion of the transcript from the August 12, 2010, sentencing hearing.
Therefore, for the same reasons discussed supra, the Idaho Supreme Court's decision
to deny Ms. Tucker's motion to augment the record with that transcript violated her
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection.

Mayer, 404 U.S. at 195;

Brunet, 155 Idaho at 727.

However, the Idaho Supreme Court also violated Ms. Tucker's rights in that
regard by denying her request to augment the record with a transcript of the July 25,
2013, hearing. That hearing was held because Ms. Tucker had asked the district court
to order that certain transcripts, including the transcript of the August 12, 2010,
sentencing hearing, be included in the appellate record. Arguments were made for and
against that request, and the district court gave its reasons for denying the request
in open court.

(Augmentation - Minutes; Augmentation - Order)

Thus, because

Ms. Tucker is contending on appeal that the district court's decision on that request
violated her due process rights, the grounds of appeal make out a colorable need for

13

that transcript to be included in the appellate record. Mayer, 404 U.S. at 195; Brunet,
155 Idaho at 727.
Furthermore, there is no adequate alternative to the verbatim transcript of that
hearing. Compare, e.g., Brunet, 155 Idaho at 728 (holding that the other materials in
the record provided a sufficient record for review). The amended notice of appeal only
designates the transcripts requested; it does not make an argument as to why they are
necessary. 6 (R., Vol.1, pp.248-251; R., Vol.2, pp.88-91.) The minutes state that the
parties argued the motion and the district court ruled on the motion, but does not recite
what those arguments or decision were. (See Augmentation - Minutes.) Instead, the
minutes simply report that the parties and the district court "cite[d] considerations."
(Augmentation - Minutes.) The order on the objection states "for the reasons stated in
open court at the hearing [the court] does hereby sustain the objection . . . ."
(Augmentation - Order.) As a result, there is nothing that is in the record or that could
be augmented to this record which would provide this Court with a sufficient record to
review the district court's decision. Thus, there is a colorable need for the transcript of
the July 25, 2013, hearing.

Mayer, 404 U.S. at 195; Brunet, 155 Idaho at 727.

Furthermore, the arguments made at that hearing on that motion were obviously part of
the record considered by the district court when it made its decision on the motion.
Therefore, the decision to deny Ms. Tucker access to that transcript violated her
constitutional rights because it deprived her of an adequate appellate record.

The Idaho Appellate Rules require only that that the appellant "designat[e] . . .
whether a transcript is requested." I.A.R. 17(h). The amended notice of appeal in this
case also conforms to the exemplar notice of appeal provided in the rule. See I.A.R. 17.
6
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111.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction Over
Ms. Tucker. Or. Alternatively. By Not Reducing Her Sentences When It Did So
A.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Relinquishing Jurisdiction Over
Ms. Tucker
The district court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction is reviewed under an abuse

of discretion standard.

State v. Hurst, 151 Idaho 430, 438 (Ct. App. 2011 );

State v. Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137 (2001 ). Such a decision will not be considered an

abuse of discretion "if the trial court has sufficient information to determine that a
suspended sentence and probation would be inappropriate." Merwin, 131 Idaho at 648.
'The purpose of retaining jurisdiction after imposing a sentence is to afford the trial court
additional time for evaluation of the defendant's rehabilitation potential and suitability for
probation."

State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205 (Ct. App. 1990).

In making that

determination, the district court "considers all of the circumstances to assess the
defendant's ability to succeed in a less structured environment and to determine the
course of action that will further the purposes of rehabilitation, protection of society,
deterrence, and retribution."

Statton, 136 Idaho at 137.

It is guided in this

determination by I.C. § 19-2521. Merwin, 131 Idaho at 648. In this regard, the need to
protect society is the primary objective the court should consider.

See, e.g.,

State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993). As such, a disposition that protects

society and also accomplishes the other objectives (rehabilitation, deterrence, and
punishment) will be considered reasonable. See id. This is because the protection of
society is influenced by each of the other objectives, and therefore, each must be
addressed in the disposition. See Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500.
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There are several factors that a court should consider to determine whether the
objectives are served by a particular disposition. See State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318,
320 (2006). They include, but are not limited to:

"the defendant's good character,

status as a first-time offender, sincere expressions of remorse and amenability to
treatment, and support of family." Id. These factors are also embodied in the factors
set forth in I.C. § 19-2521. Insufficient consideration of these factors has been the basis
for a more lenient sentence in several cases. See, e.g., State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho
593, 595 (1982); Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Alberts,
121 Idaho 204,209 (Ct. App. 1991 ); State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App.
1988), rev'd on other grounds, 117 Idaho 295, 301 (1990). In this case, several of those
factors are present, but were insufficiently considered by the court as it made its
disposition regarding Ms. Tucker after she completed her period of retained jurisdiction.
A sufficient consideration reveals that Ms. Tucker's performance during her period of
retained jurisdiction, when combined with the mitigating factors present in her case,
indicate that he should be able to succeed in a less structured environment and a
disposition providing her with the opportunity to do so will still serve the objectives.
Therefore, the decision to relinquish jurisdiction does not serve the objectives, and is an
abuse of the district court's discretion.
Notably, the conviction in the Cassia County case was Ms. Tucker's first felony
conviction.

(PSI, pp.3-4.) The Idaho Supreme Court has "recognized that the first

offender should be accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal."
Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595, (quoting State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394,402 (1953), overruled
on other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 228 (1971 )).
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Therefore, it

considered the fact that it was the defendant's first felony to be a factor in mitigation.
Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595.

Furthermore, Ms. Tucker was only twenty-two years old when she was
sentenced in the Cassia County case.

(PSI, p.1.)

Studies indicate that a young

person's character continues to develop into early adulthood. See, e.g., Brief for the
American Psychological Association, et al. as Amici Curiae in Graham v. Florida, 130
S. Ct. 2011 (2010), 2009 WL 2236778, at 12. For example, a young person's ability to
consider future consequences of an action continues to develop into the early 20s. Id.
(referencing Jari-Erik Nurmi, How Do Adolescents See Their Future? A Review of the
Development of Future Orientation and Planning, 11 Developmental Rev. 1, 28-29

(1991); Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Future Orientation and Delay
Discounting, 80 Child Dev. 28, 30, 35-36 (2009)). As such, when a defendant is of an

age similar to Ms. Tucker, her age is a factor which weighs in mitigation because it
speaks significantly to this rehabilitative potential. Shideler, 103 Idaho at 395; Cook,
145 Idaho at 489; State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 639 (Ct. App. 1988). Basically, a
younger offender should be treated more leniently because she is still maturing, and still
able to become a productive member of society. See, e.g., State v. Dunnagan, 101
Idaho 125, 126 (1980).
In addition, Ms. Tucker had a troubled childhood.

Her mother's addiction to

drugs led to and facilitated Ms. Tucker's own addiction. (PSI, p.5.) Another result of her
mother's addiction was an unstable home life, which resulted in abuse. (PSI, p.5.) In
fact, Ms. Tucker ultimately had to be adopted by her brothers, a situation which fell
apart when she turned eighteen. (PSI, p.5.) Ms. Tucker also reported being raped by a
friend when she was fourteen. (PSI, p.5.) When a defendant has a troubled history,
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particularly when it serves as a precursor to the abuse of narcotics, and thus, the
underlying offense, that is a factor which should be weighed against the offense.
State v. Williamson, 135 Idaho 618, 620 (Ct. App. 2001 ).

And yet, despite her past, Ms. Tucker had been making commendable efforts at
rehabilitation. As IDHW reported, Ms. Tucker was able to maintain employment with
two different employers.

(Letter from Beth Bristol attached to PSI.)

One of those

employers also wrote a letter in support of Ms. Tucker, noting that she was a good
worker and an asset to the company. (Undated Letter from the manager of Mr. Wash,
attached to PSI; compare PSI, p.7 (indicating that Ms. Tucker had verified employment
at Mr. Gas Car Wash).) A defendant's reliability and dedication as a working member of
society is a factor which the district courts should consider as part of the defendant's
character. State v. Baiz, 120 Idaho 292,293 (Ct. App. 1991). Furthermore, Ms. Tucker
has the potential to become an even more productive member of society, as she has
verified college education and was planning on taking additional classes while on
probation. (PSI, p.10.)
Ms. Tucker had also been building a support network centered on her children's
paternal grandparents. 7 (Letter from Beth Bristol attached to PSI.) As such, IDHW was
working towards reunification between Ms. Tucker and her children. Family constitutes
an important part of a support network, which can help in rehabilitation.

See

State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812,817 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding that familial support offered

The family of Ms. Tucker's fiance has remained her primary source of support, even
though a No Contact Order was placed between Ms. Tucker and her fiance by the
department of probation and parole, as both had been convicted of felonies. (See
R., Vol.1, p.131.) The drug court judge, recognizing the issue in this regard, specifically
allowed Ms. Tucker to maintain contact with her fiance's family, so long as she did not
have contact with her fiance. (R., Vol.1, p.131.)
7
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to affirm the defendant's innocence does not equate to familial support offered in
consideration of rehabilitation, implying that had the support been offered for
rehabilitation, it would be a mitigating factor worthy of consideration).

The fact that

Ms. Tucker was building such a network was a factor that needed to be considered in
mitigation.
Unfortunately, this network was not strong enough when Ms. Tucker's mother
passed away, an event which was a primary contributor to her relapse. That is not
surprising when Ms. Tucker's mental condition is sufficiently considered. (See GRRS,
p.2 (diagnosing Ms. Tucker with major depressive disorder).) Idaho Code § 19-2523
requires the trial court to consider a defendant's mental illness as a sentencing factor.
Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999). That condition is capable of preventing a

person from functioning normally. National Institute of Mental Health, "Depression," p.3
(revised 2011 ), available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/depression/
depression-booklet.pdf. Episodes of depression are often caused by a combination of
genetic, biological, environmental, and psychological factors. Id. at 6. Thus, although
Ms. Tucker was performing well on probation for the first two years, the effect of her
mother's death, when viewed in context with her mental health diagnosis, indicates that
Ms. Tucker, once stabilized, could return to being a productive member of society, and
thus, capable of complying with the terms and conditions of probation. Therefore, the
district court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction constitutes an abuse of discretion.
Ms. Tucker's performance during her rider, while not perfect, also demonstrates
a potential for rehabilitation. After all, she was able to complete most of her assigned
programs and she did not receive any formal disciplinary sanctions. (APSI, pp.2, 4-5.)
Furthermore, as the district court pointed out in relation to Ms. Tucker's subsequent
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request for relief pursuant to I.C.R. 35, Ms. Tucker could still benefit from additional
treatment programs. (R., Vol.2, p.69.) IDHW already verified that Ms. Tucker is willing
and capable of following through on such treatment in the community. (See Letter from
Beth Bristol attached to PSI.)

Therefore, this also indicates that a more lenient

sentence was appropriate in Ms. Tucker's case.

A sufficient examination of all these factors reveals that suspended sentences,
which consider rehabilitation, would still address all the other objectives - protection of
society, punishment, and deterrence. See State v. Ransom, 124 Idaho 703, 713 (1993)
(requiring that alternative sentences still address all the sentencing objectives). When a
sentencing court suspends a sentence and orders probation, it still imposes and
executes a sentence. Therefore, both the retributive and the deterrent effects of the
imposed sentence are still present.

See State v. Crockett, 146 Idaho 13, 14-15

(Ct. App. 2008) (discussing how a sentence for a period of probation addresses all the
sentencing objectives and how the court's continuing jurisdiction affects those
objectives).

In addition to restricting her liberty at the discretion of the Board of

Correction and the looming sentence, Ms. Tucker would also be deprived of several of
her rights (such as the right to possess a firearm), since this is a felony offense.
Furthermore, the district court would retain the ability to revoke probation and execute
the original sentence if Ms. Tucker were to fail to adhere to the terms of her probation.
However, it could do so knowing that all the sentencing objectives properly addressed.
What the probationary period would provide that a term sentence would not is the
opportunity to rehabilitate in a real-world setting, allowing Ms. Tucker to apply the
lessons she would gain in out-patient treatment in a practical setting.

The decision to

incarcerate her, on the other hand, only serves to delay that sort of rehabilitative
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opportunity, and thus, does not as effectively address the goals of sentencing. As such,
it constitutes an abuse of discretion.

8.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Reducing Ms. Tucker's Sentence
When It Relinquished Jurisdiction Over Her
Even if the district court did not abuse its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction, it

did abuse its discretion by not reducing Ms. Tucker's sentence, sua sponte, pursuant to
I.C.R. 35 when it did so.

After a defendant has completed a period of retained

jurisdiction, the district court may suspend the sentence, which results in the defendant
being placed on probation, or it can resume the execution of the underlying sentence.
State v. Goodlett, 139 Idaho 262, 264 (Ct. App. 2003). If the district court decides to
resume the execution of the underlying sentence, it also has the authority to reduce the
sentence, sua sponte, pursuant to Rule 35. Id.; see also State

v. Timbana, 145 Idaho

779, 782 (2008) (applying the same rule to the decision to the similar situation of
probation revocation).
The decision to not reduce a previously-pronounced sentence will be reversed on
appeal if it constitutes an abuse of the district court's discretion. State v. Hanington,
148 Idaho 26, 27 (Ct. App. 2009). The standard of review and factors considered in
such a decision are the same as those used for the initial sentencing. Id. (citing among
others, State v. Toohi/1, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982)). Therefore, the district
court needed to sufficiently consider the recognized sentencing objectives in light of the
mitigating factors in the record. See id.; Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500. A failure to do
so should result in a more lenient sentence. See, e.g., Cook, 145 Idaho at 489-90;
Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595.
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A sufficient examination of the factors discussed in Section ll(A), supra, reveals
that, at least, more lenient sentences were appropriate. More lenient sentences would
still address all the sentencing objectives.

See e.g., Crockett, 146 Idaho at 14-15

(discussing how even a sentence for a period of probation addresses all the sentencing
objectives). In this case, the court would not lose anything in terms of protection of
society, deterrence, or punishment by imposing a more lenient sentence. Society would
receive equally similar protection in both cases, as Ms. Tucker would be in the custody
of the Department of Correction either way.

She would be unable to harm society

during the period of initial incarceration, and the parole board would maintain the
discretion to release her again, or, if need be, continue to keep her in prison.
What the more lenient sentence would provide that the excessive sentence
would not is the opportunity to rehabilitate, and as the Supreme Court has noted,
rehabilitation is more likely now than in the future.

See Owen, 73 Idaho at 402.

Specifically, it would give Ms. Tucker the opportunity to return to her children and work
on rebuilding her support network while being a contributing member of her community.
To not do so will result in lesser protection for society in the long term, which means the
sentence fails to sufficiently address the primary sentencing objective, and thus requires
modification.
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Tucker respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and the
opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise
as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Ms. Tucker respectfully
requests that this Court vacate the order relinquishing jurisdiction and remand this case
for an order placing her on probation. Alternatively, she requests that this Court reduce
her sentences as it deems appropriate, or remand the case for a reduction of sentence
pursuant to I.C.R. 35.
DATED this 20 th day of March, 2014.

RIANR. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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